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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Obscenity-Materials May Be
Obscene for Minors without Being
Obscene for Adults
Defendant Ginsberg was found guilty of violating section 484-h of
the NEw YorK PENAL LAW, which prohibits the sale to minors under
seventeen years of age of material defined to be obscene on the basis
of its appeal to them, whether or not it would be obscene to adults.'
Defendant contended that section 484-h was unconstitutional on the
ground that the scope of constitutional freedom of expression secured
to a citizen to read or see material concerned with sex may not be
made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor.2
The Nassau County District Court judgment was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Term of the New York Supreme Court, and
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A statute
prohibiting the sale to minors under seventeen of material defined to
be obscene on the basis of its appeal to minors without regard for
whether the material would be obscene to adults is a valid and reason-
able regulation of obscenity.3 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
1. Section 484-h of the N.Y. PENrAL LAw reads in pertinent part:
"1. Definitions. As used in this section: (a) "Minor" means any person under the age
of seventeen years .... (f) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description
or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or
sado-masochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors ... .
"2. It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan for monetary con-
sideration to a minor: (a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture
film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human
body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is
harmful to minors, or (b) any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however
reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph
(a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative
accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which,
taken as a whole, is harmful to minors." NEv YoRuK PENAL LAw § 484-h, now §§
235.20 to -.22 of N.Y. PEN. LAw (McKinney ed. 1967).
2. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). The defendant also con-
tended that section 484-h was unconstitutional, because (1) the denial to minors under
seventeen of access to material condemned by section 484-h, insofar as that material
is not obscene for persons seventeen years or older, is an unconstitutional deprivation
of protected liberties, and (2) section 484-h is void for vagueness. Id. at 637, 643.
3. The Supreme Court also held that section 484-h was not an invasion of a minor's
constitutionally protected rights, nor was section 484-h void for vagueness. Id.
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The constitutionality of an obscenity statute was first expressly
determined by the Supreme Court in 1948 in Doubleday & Co. v.
New York,4 which affirmed, by an equally divided Court, a New York
Court of Appeals decision5 that had declared the New York statute
unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness. 6 In 1957, however, the
Court held in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California7 that
sufficiently explicit drafting of an obscenity statue could immunize it
from constitutional attack.8 The test for judging obscenity laid down
by Mr. justice Brennan9 was "whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."10 This has
remained the most important test of obscenity." In three separate
opinions, Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan, Black, and
Douglas announced differing views on the definition of obscenity and
the constitutionality of obscenity statutes to which they all still sub-
stantially adhere.' 2 Chief Justice Warren maintained that since the
conduct of the defendant is the central issue, allegedly obscene ma-
terials should be considered in the context from which they draw
4. 335 U.S. 848 (1948). Prior to the Doubleday case, "dicta had referred to gov-
ernmental regulation of obscenity as valid, and in 1942 dicta declaring obscenity an
area of unprotected speech began to appear." 36 TEx. L. REV. 226, 227 (1957)
(footnote omitted).
5. People v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E. 2d 6 (1947).
6. At this time the doctrine as applied to statutes which infringed first amendment
guarantees seemed to be: "Any statute authorizing governmental interference (whether
by 'prior restraint' or punishment) with free speech or free press runs counter to
the First Amendment, except when the government can show that the statute strikes
at words which are likely to incite to a breach of the peace, or with sufficient
probability tend either to the overthrow of the government by illegal means or to
some other overt anti-social conduct." United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 802 (2d
Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
7. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Roth and Alberts cases were combined for hearing.
See The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HAzv. L. Rzv. 226 (1957).
8. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957). Earlier in 1957, in Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Supreme Court had unanimously declared an
obscenity statute unconstitutional on the ground that the statute was not reasonably
restricted to the evil with which it purported to deal. Id. at 383.
9. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Burton, Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker.
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
11. See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
12. Compare Roth v. United, States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957) (Warren, C.J., con-
curring) and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting), with Ginzburg v. United States, -383 U.S. 463 (1966), and Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). Compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957)
(opinion of Harlan, J.), with Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966).
Compare Roth v. United States, 354,.U.S: 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
with Ginzburg v. New York,, 383 U.S. 463, 482 (1966) (same). Compare Roth v.
United States, 354 US.. 476, 508. (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting), with Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
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color and character.13 Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the permissible
scope of state obscenity statutes should be broader than the permis-
sible scope of federal obscenity statutes.14 The Court, he said, when
reviewing state obscenity cases, should inquire only "whether the state
action so subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the due process
clause that it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power."'"
As to the permissible scope of federal obscenity statutes, Justice
Harlan said that they should not be construed to reach more than
"hard-core" pornography. 16 Justices Black and Douglas, on the other
hand, dissented on the ground that "[f]reedom of expression can be
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with
illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it." 17
In 1958, the Court reversed without opinion four court of appeals
decisions upholding obscenity censorship.' 8 Although the basis of
these per curiam decisions was not elaborated, it would seem that the
Court intended to apply the first amendment "to confine obscenity
censorship within very narrow limits indeed."19 In the following year,
in Smith v. California,20 the Court confined obscenity convictions
within even narrower limits by applying the element of scienter to
criminal obscenity convictions.21 Then, in 1962 and 1964, decisions
13. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 494-95 (1957) (concurring opinion). Warren
said that he would affirm the convictions because the defendants were plainly engaged
in the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with
prurient appeal. Id. at 495-96. In addition, the Chief Justice said: "Present laws
depend largely upon the effect that the materials may have upon those %vho receive
them. It is manifest that the same object may have a different impact, varying accord-
ing to the part of the community it reached." Id. at 495.
14. Id. at 503. Justice Harlan's opinion stems from his refusal to adopt the "incorpo-
ration theory" of the fourteenth amendment.
15. Id. at 501.
16. Id. at 507. Justice Harlan also said that he did not see how the Court could
resolve the constitutional problems of obscenity without making an independent
judgment on the character of the material upon which the convictions were based.
354 U.S. at 497-98.
17. Id. at 514.
18. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen,
355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1958); Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1958).
19. Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINI. L. REv. 5, 35 (1960). See also Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684 (1959), in which the Court unanimously, but in no less than six opinions,
held a New York obscenity statute unconstitutional.
20. 361 U. S. 147 (1959); see The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REv.
81, 126 (1960).
21. Id. at 153. The Court declared the Los Angeles ordinance unconstitutional
because it eliminated all mental elements from the crime and thus tended seriously to
restrict the dissemination of books that are not obscene. See also Lockhart and
McClure, supra note 19, at 46.
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in two additional cases, Manual Enterprises v. Day22 and Jacobellis
v. Ohio,2 gave the opportunity for further exposition of the Justices'
positions, although no opinion was joined by a majority.24 These
varied positions were clarified somewhat by three decisions handed
down in 1966. In Ginzburg v. United States2 the majority opin-
ion6 added to the Roth test a "pandering" element under which
materials could be found obscene because of the context in which
they were disseminated.27 In Mishkin v. New York,8 the majority
of the Court2 said that when material is designed for and primarily
disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than
the public at large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test
is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
22. 370 U.S. 478 (1962); see 16 VAIN. L. REv. 251 (1962).
23. 378 U.S. 184 (1964); see Meara and Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court:
A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NoTmE D mm L. tEv. 1 (1964).
24. It is clear from these decisions that: (1) Justices Harlan, Stewart, Brennan
and Goldberg advocated the use of a national standard of decency in judging federal
obscenity cases. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964); Manual Enterprises
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962); (2) Justices Brennan and Goldberg advocated the
use of a national standard of decency in all obscenity cases. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964); (3) Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark advocated a
community standard of decency, rather than a national standard. Id. at 200;
(4) Justice Stewart would limit state and federal criminal obscenity laws to "hard-core"
pornography. Id. at 197; (5) Justice Clark would declare obscene materials contain-
ing information as to where obscene material may be obtained. Manual Enterprises v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 520 (1962); (6) Justices Brennan and Goldberg, and possibly a
majority of the Court, would hold that material dealing with sex in a manner that
"advocates ideas ... or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any other form
of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the constitutional
protection." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); see also, Kingsley Pictures
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Lockhart and McClure, supra note 19, at 39;
and (7) Justices Brennan and Goldberg, and possibly a majority of the Court, would
hold that obscenity is excluded from constitutional protection only when it is com-
pletely without redeeming social importance, and that the constitutional status of
material cannot be made to turn on a weighing of its social importance against its
prurient appeal. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See also Grove Press v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964);
Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576 (1964).
25. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See also 44 TEx. L. REv. 1382 (1966).
26. The majority was composed of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan,
Clark, Fortas and White.
27. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966). The majority said that
where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publica-
tions, that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscenity. Id The majority
obviously followed the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Roth and his
dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494
(1957) (concurring opinion); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
28. 383 U.S. 502 (1966); see The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91,
186 (1966).
29. The majority was composed of Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Brennan,
Clark, Fortas and White.
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appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group."
And in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,31 Justice Brennan, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, reaffirmed the validity of the Roth
test and held that a determination of obscenity could stand only when
three elements coalesce: (1) the dominant theme of the material must
appeal to a prurient interest in sex; (2) the material must be patently
offensive in that it affronts contemporary community standards re-
lating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (3)
the material must be utterly lacking in redeeming social importance. 32
Justice Brennan added that each of these elements must be satisfied
independently, although the circumstances of production and dissemi-
nation may be decisive when the material has only slight social value.31
Finally, in 1967, the Supreme Court, refusing to find the materials in-
volved obscene, handed down a number of per curiam decisions4
which tended to establish realistic guidelines for the application of
the Roth, Ginzburg and Mishkin cases by providing numerous con-
crete examples of nonobscene materials.-
In the instant case, the Court, by Justice Brennan,36 recognized
that the "girlie" magazines sold by the defendant were not obscene
for adults; but held that they could be proscribed by the states as
obscene for minors, even when there is an invasion of protected free-
doms.37 Reasoning that constitutional decisions have consistently
recognized parents' claims to authority in the rearing of their chil-
dren as basic in our society, the Court concluded that legislatures
could properly determine that those primarily responsible for chil-
dren's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid
in the discharge of that responsibility.3 8 In addition, the Court noted
30. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). This clearly overrules the
decisions, adhered to by Justices Brennan, Harlan, Stewart and Goldberg in Jacobe]lis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964), and Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
488 (1962), in which a national standard of decency was espoused.
31. 383 U.S. 413 (1966); see The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 28 at 186;
44 TEx. L. REv. 1382 (1966).
32. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
33. Id. at 420.
34. See, e.g., Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Mazes
v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967).
35. In these cases, the Supreme Court held that books, such as ORoY CLUn and
SEx Lias OF A Cop, and magazines, such as Exclusive (a collection of nude women),
Revue International (a collection of nude men), and International Nudist Sun (same),
were not obscene. Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S. 50, reo'g 373
F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1967); Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967), rev'g 7 Ohio
St. 2d 136, 218 N.E.2d 725 (1966); Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967),
rev'g 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966).
36. Justice Brennan was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Harlan, White and
Marshall.
37. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634, 638 (1968).
38. Id. at 639.
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that the states quite properly have an independent interest in the
development of their youth and that the Court could not say that
section 484-h has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding
their youth from harm.39 Consequently, the Court concluded that
it is not unconstitutional to accord minors under seventeen years of
age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge for
themselves what sex material they may see and read.4°
In the instant case the Supreme Court follows the principle that
materials should be considered in the context in which they are dis-
seminated, a position first enunciated by Chief Justice Warren in
Roth4' and followed in Memoirs,2 Ginzburg,43 and Mishkin.44 Al-
though the instant case is a particularly logical extension of Mishkin,45
it has none of the less added confusion to an area of law already
inextricably confused. Now that (1) the nature of obscenity varies
with the group to which it is directed; and (2) the context in which
allegedly obscene materials are sold may be determinative of the
question of obscenity, it is increasingly more difficult to synthesize
39. Id. at 640, 643.
40. Id. at 637. The Court also concluded that § 484-h was not unconstitutionally
void for vagueness, because the essential words of the section have been defined
propertly by the state's highest court. Id. at 643-44. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Stewart said that the Constitution not only protects one's freedom to say or write or
publish what he wishes, but the Constitution also guarantees a society of free choice.
Id. at 648, 649. Stewart continued, however, that when expression occurs in a setting
in which the capacity to make a choice is missing, government regulation of that
expression may co-exist with the first amendment. Stewart also said that states could
permissibly determine that children do not possess the ful capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of first amendment guarantees. Consequently,
Stewart concluded that in certain well-delineated areas, such as obscenity, the states
could deprive children of rights even though similar deprivation would be constitution-
ally intolerable for adults. Id. at 649-50. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas,
with whom Justice Black concurred, said that he did not believe obscenity was
implicitly excluded from the protections of the first and fourteenth amendments. Id.
at 650, 652-53. Thus, Douglas concluded that § 484-h was an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of first and fourteenth amendment guarantees. Id. at 655. Justice Fortas also
dissented. Agreeing that states in the exercise of their police powers, even in the
first amendment domain, could make proper differentiation between adults and children,
nonetheless this differentiation could not be made on an arbitrary basis. Fortas there-
fore concluded that the Court must define what it means by obscenity with respect to
minors in order to prevent the arbitrary exercises of state censorship. Id. at 671, 673.
41. 354 U.S. 476, 494, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
42. 383 U.S. 413, 420 (1966).
43. 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
44. 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
45. In Mishkin, the Court said that "... when the material is designed for and pri-
marily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members
of that group. . . . We adjust the prurient appeal requirement to social realities by-
permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual
interests of its intended and probable recipient group." Id. at 508-09.
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these factors in a coherent and predictable test for obscenity. If the
Court adheres to the trend apparently established by Mishkin and
the instant case, greater emphasis -will have to be placed on specific
group characteristics. To the extent that this has already happened,
the guidelines as to what is not obscene which were set down by
the Court in the numerous per curiam decisions in 196746 are of
minimal value, since there is now required not only a consideration
of the allegedly obscene materials, but also a consideration of the
context in which they were disseminated and a consideration of the
primary groups to whom the materials are disseminated. The result
is that while the Court would seem to be attempting to escape a
case by case determination of obscenity,47 the nature of the Court's
obscenity decisions make a case by case analysis inevitable. Thus,
although the Supreme Court cannot abdicate completely its first
amendment jurisdiction, it is arguable that the Court is not the
proper agency to fashion a coherent body of common law. Mass
interstate distribution, of course, requires federal overseeing, but state
concern need not be entirely overlooked in the process. For this
reason it may be argued, with Justice Harlan, "that the Constitution
tolerates much wider authority and discretion in the States to control
the dissemination of obscene materials than it does in the Federal
Government"48 and that federal control of obscene materials should
be limited to "hard-core" pornography.
Constitutional Law-Standing-Federal Taxpayer
Has Standing To Challenge Federal Expenditures
Violating Specific Constitutional Prohibition
Appellants sued in federal district court to enjoin the allegedly
unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds,' which appellants con-
tended were being used to finance studies and purchases of textbooks
in religious schools in contravention of the free exercise and establish-
ment clauses of the first amendment. Appellants rested solely on their
46. The decisions are cited in the Ginsberg case, 390 U.S. at 634, n.3.
47. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199, 202-203 (1964) (Warren, CJ.,
dissenting).
48. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Unfortunately, Justice Harlan's view would
probably require the repudiation by the Court of the "incorporation" theory of the
fourteenth amendment.
1. The funds were appropriated under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, Titles I and II, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241(a) etc., 811 etc. (Supp. 1966).
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status as federal taxpayers in asserting standing to bring the action.
A three judge court2 granted the government's motion to dismiss for
lack of standing. On direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. A taxpayer has standing to invoke the federal
judicial power upon a showing that Congressional action under powers
granted by the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of express
constitutional restrictions upon those powers. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968).
In Forthingham v. Melon,3 the Supreme Court held that one's mere
status as a federal taxpayer was insufficient to impart standing to
challenge the legality of federal expenditures. In order to achieve
standing, said the Court, the challenger must show past or impending
"direct injury" resulting from the expenditure, not merely an indefinite
suffering common to all taxpayers.4 The Court distinguished a munici-
pal taxpayer's challenge of municipal expenditures on the ground that
his interest in the application of such funds is direct and immediate,5
whereas a federal taxpayer's interest in the disbursement of federal
funds is "comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect
upon future taxation, of any payment out of funds, is so removed,
fluctuating, and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to
the preventive powers of a court of equity."6 The prevailing view
has been that Frothingham declared a rule of judicial self-restraint
rather than providing an additional gloss on the constitution's "cases
and controversies" 7 limitation of federal court jurisdiction.8 As such
a declaration, the case has been widely criticized,9 principally on
the illusory distinction it made between the relative impacts on federal
and municipal taxpayers, 10 a distinction few state courts have drawn
between state and municipal taxpayers." Even courts purporting to
sustain a rule similar to that declared in Frothingham have been
willing to overlook or bypass the problem of standing when they
have been presented with substantive issues of unusual importance, 12
and the Supreme Court itself has seemingly ignored the standing
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
3. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
4. Id. at 488.
5. Id. at 486.
6. Id. at 487.
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
8. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 92 n.6 (1968).
9. See, e.g., WiUGHT, FEDERAL Couras 37 (1963); Davis, "Judicial Control of
Administrative Actiov: A Review, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 635, 659-69 (1966).
10. Davis, supra note 9, at 664-65; Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental
Action, 39 Mnm. L. REv. 353, 388 (1955).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Kush v. Curran, 294 N.Y. 207, 61 N.E.2d 513 (1945); Reiter v.
Wallgren, 28 Wash. 2d 872, 184 P.2d 571 (1947).
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problem when sufficiently eager to proceed to substantive questions.
13
Despite the criticism it has engendered and its analytic inconsistencies,
Frothingham has continued to be relied upon.'4
In the instant case, the Court first examined the government's
argument that article III of the Constitution demanded the broad
rule announced in Frothingham.15 The Court noted that justiciability,
an aspect of which is standing, had become a "blend of constitutional
requirements and policy considerations." 16 Thus, said the Court, the
relation of standing to article III limitations was that it served as a
standard by which the propriety of a suit as a dispute capable of
judicial resolution could be measured. This historical standard em-
phasized the stake a plaintiff had in the outcome of his suit; since a
taxpayer might or might not have the requisite personal stake, his
status as a mere taxpayer was not an absolute bar under article III.17
The Court then noted that past decisions had established the necessity
of examining substantive issues in cases to determine whether there
was "a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought
to be adjudicated." 8 The nexus demanded had two aspects: (1) a
logical link between the taxpayer's status and the legislation attacked;
and (2) a link between his status and the nature of the alleged consti-
tutional infringement. "When both nexuses are established, the
litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the
controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a
federal court's jurisdiction." 9 The taxpayer in the instant case was
held to have met this test in that (1) the constitutional challenge was
made to an exercise of Congress's spending power which involved a
13. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Though the petitioner was
a local taxpayer, questions of standing were raised but not discussed. But see Doremus
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) distinguishing Everson; Jaffe, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAv. L. REv. 1265, 1310 (1961).
14. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151
(1951); Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295, 305 (1945).
15. Before considering the issue of standing, the Court met the government's con-
tention that the improper convening of the three judge court precluded a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964). In response to the govern-
ment's argument that appellants wished only to enjoin specific local programs rather
than a broad range of programs under a statutory scheme, the Court said it viewed
the complaint's specific allegations as merely narrowing the issues in the suit and not
limiting the appellants constitutional challenges. To the government's contention that
the appellant's challenge of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act's adminis-
tration as well as its constitutionality rendered the convening of the three judge court
improper, the Court responded that, under the rule announced in Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965), "a litigant need not abandon his constitutional arguments in order to
obtain a three judge court...." 381 U.S. at 5-6.
16. 392 U.S. at 97.
17. Id. at 101.
18. Id. at 102, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-30 (1961).
19. 392 U.S. at 103.
[ VOL. 21
RECENT CASES
substantial expenditure of federal tax funds, and (2) the challenged
expenditures allegedly violated the specific limitations found in the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. The
Court then distinguished the instant case from Frothingham on the
ground that, while the taxpayer in Frothinghaam had, in attacking a
federal spending program, established the first nexus, she had lacked
standing because her attack on the expenditure was not based on an
alleged breach of a specific limitation on Congress's spending power.
20
In his dissent 2' Mr. Justice Harlan argued that the two criteria
established by the majority did not measure a plaintiff's interest in
the outcome of his suit. Neither the fact that the challenged expendi-
ture was pursuant to a federal spending program, rather than inci-
dental to a regulatory program, nor the plaintiff's claiming under a
constitutional provision which specifically limited Congress's spending
power, rather than under any constitutional provision, was viewed
by Justice Harlan as related to the determination of standing. With-
out a broad interpretation of Frothingham's restriction on taxpayer's
suits, suggested Justice Harlan, "unrestricted public actions might well
alter the allocation of authority among the three branches of the
Federal Government."22
The fundamental aspect of standing, as opposed to other aspects
of justiciability, is that it focuses on the litigant rather than on the
substantive matters in a case.P Standing serves two policies: first, it
helps insure that cases brought before the Supreme Court have "that
concrete adverseness whch sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions."2 Secondly, the concept of standing limits the
role of the Supreme Court to adjudication of disputes traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution. It thus maintains the balance of
powers by limiting the number and scope of public actions and pre-
20. Id. at 105. In Frothingham, the taxpayer had alleged a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The instant court noted, however, that
the due process clause does not protect taxpayers from increases in tax liability.
21. Three concurring opinions were also entered. Mr. Justice Douglas thought that
although the court's standards were imprecise, they would eventually lead to the
complete erosion of Frothingham, a demise Justice Douglas would encourage. Mr.
Justice Stewart emphasized the distinction between the instant case and Frothingham
and expressed his understanding that the instant case held "only that a federal taxpayer
has standing to assert that a specific expenditure of federal funds violates the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment." Mr. Justice Fortas agreed substantially with
Mr. Justice Stewart and warned that the instant case "should not be accepted as a
launching pad for an attack upon any target other than legislation affecting the
Establishment Clause."
22. 392 U.S. at 130.
23. 392 U.S. at 99.
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
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venting the Court from becoming a mere instrument of revision. The
concept of standing as an absolute bar to federal taxpayers' suits has
been an inadequate standard insofar as it has rested on the myth of
the taxpayer's lack of a stake in the action. Many large corporations,
for example, have a substantial stake in the expenditure of every tax
dollar.25 Though his personal tax contribution may be lost in the
general revenue, becoming unidentifiable when revenues are dis-
bursed, the individual taxpayer undeniably has some stake in the
expenditure of his tax dollar. Although he has no direct property
interest in his tax contribution, that contribution was made with the
understanding that it would not be spent in violation of the Constitu-
tion. If no taxpayer or other person can show a unique and direct
injury from unconstitutional disbursements of federal funds, it follows
that unconstitutonal expenditures could be immune from all but
Congressional attack. Furthermore, the suggestion that the question
be settled by a decision on the merits of a constitutional issue-
whether Congress has the full power under the Constitution to make
expenditures for the general welfareS-is an avoidance rather than
a solution. While not all taxpayers should be permitted to challenge
any federal expenditure, it should be possible for taxpayers who
suffer no other injury to challenge expenditures which are allegedly
unconstitutional. The instant case is a step toward the realization of
that possibility and toward a redefinition of standing. Hopefully, the
result will be, rather than one of the "most amorphous [concepts] in
the domain of public law,"2 7 a workable set of rules which will serve
the traditional policies on which standing has rested and will, at the
same time, permit a taxpayer to instigate needed challenges of
unconstitutional federal expenditures.
Copyright-Telecommunication-CATY Carriage of
Copyrighted Material Does not
Constitute Infringement
Petitioner owned and operated community antenna television
(CATV) stations in two West Virginia towns. Although local television
25. Davis, Standing To Challenge Governmental Action, 39 Mnix. L. REV. 353, 387
(1955), noting that General Motors has as much as a 2% stake in every federal expendi-
ture.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; Davis, supra note 24, at 391.
27. 392 U.S. at 99, cited Hearings on S. 2097 before the Subcommittee on Consti-
tutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2 Sess., 465, 498 (1966)
(Statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund).
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stations served the area, reception of television broadcasts from
more distant stations was prevented by surrounding mountainous ter-
rain. Seeking more program variety than the local stations could
provide, the majority of television owners in both communities
subscribed at a flat monthly rate to petitioner's CATV service,1
which was capable of receiving the signals of five distant stations.
These signals were then amplified, modulated and converted to dif-
ferent frequencies, increasing their strength, and then transmitted
to the individual subscriber by means of a coaxial cable system.
The petitioner neither edited the programs received from the distant
stations nor originated any programs of its own.2 Respondent, hold-
ing copyrights on several motion pictures, licensed the five distant
television stations to broadcast the copyrighted films, which were
received by the petitioner and carried to its subscribers. Neither re-
spondent nor the five distant stations had licensed the petitioner to
carry the film broadcasts. Indeed, the licenses granted by respondent
to the five distant stations, in several instances, specifically prohibited
CATV carriage. Seeking damages and injunctive relief, respondent
urged that carriage of the film broadcasts by the petitioner's CATV
system was an unlicensed performance of copyrighted material, consti-
tuting an infringement of copyright under the Copyright Act of 1909.
3
1. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) for a gen-
eral discussion of CATV systems. CATV systems are usually operated in small
towns or in cities which are either too far from regular television stations to receive
programming of all of the major networks or are shielded from stations' signals by
obstructions such as hills, mountains, or tall buildings. See also B. RucER, Tr FrsT
FREEDOM 175 (1968).
2. Some CATV systems do originate their own programs. It is estimated that three
hundred systems provide twenty-four-hour weather service and news programs, while
an additional seventy-five produce live programs of local interest. Some systems also
-sell commercial time. See RucKER, supra note 1, at 179.
3. 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In pertinent part the Act provides
that any person holding a copyright shall have the exclusive right: "(c) To deliver,
authorize delivery of, read or present the copyrighted work in public for profit . . .
to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which,
in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered,
presented, produced, or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and
to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method what-
soever. . . . (d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be
a drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend
any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of
any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in
any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced or
reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any man-
ner or by any method whatsoever ... (e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly
for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the purpose of public performance
for profit . . . to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any
system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced ....
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Petitioner contended that a CATV system, regardless of its complexity,
was merely a device designed to carry out the same function as a
simple antenna in allowing an individual set owner to receive distant
television broadcasts. Petitioner further argued that the "performance"
of the work in question was the active function of the original broad-
caster and that therefore it could not be said that the operation of a
CATV system functioning as a mere passive antenna constituted a
performance. The district court held for respondent,4 and the Court
of Appeals affimed.5 On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Since a CATV system does no more than en-
hance an individual subscriber's capacity to receive the original broad-
cast signal, such an operation does not constitute an infringing per-
formance of a copyrighted work. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
Initially, CATV systems were designed to provide television service
to areas which were either too far distant from regular television
stations to receive their signals or were unable to pick up clear signals
due to interference from tall buildings or mountains. 6 Increasingly,
however, CATV systems have expanded into areas without a real
topographical need, and which are already served by local television.,
Because of this continued expansion,8 a great deal of opposition to
CATV has been generated among two groups deeply involved in the
television industry. One of these groups is composed of television
broadcasters who fear that further CATV expansion will significantly
decrease the size of their audiences. Members of this group launched
a futile legal attack on CATV systems under state unfair competition
4. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
5. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967).
6. See RucKER, supra note 1, at 175. The facts of the instant case demonstrate
clearly the effects of mountainous terrain on regular television signals. Rucker reports
that individual viewers in the big urban areas may also need CATV service to receive
clear signals due to the interference of tall buildings with regular broadcast signals. For
example, 500,000 viewers in Manhattan do not get adequate television service for this
reason.
7. Id. at 176 n.22. Rucker reports that there are 460 CATV systems in the "top
one hundred markets," with 119 under construction and 500 more franchises having
been awarded. Another 1200 applications for franchises are now pending.
8. I& at 176. In 1966, the number of operational CATV systems in the U.S. had
increased to an estimated 1,675 serving approximately two million subscribers. At the
same time, 1,503 new franchises had been granted and 1,420 cities were considering
applications; the figures rose to 2,138 systems in operation or under construction,
1,082 additional franchises granted, and 1,630 applications pending in 1967. It is
estimated that the number of systems and subscribers will double by 1970. It is
obvious that a tremendous amount of money has been invested in CATV systems by
their operators, and it is not uncommon for the initial investment alone to run as
high as several million dollars. Multiplying this figure by the number of systems
planned or in operation gives an indication of the economic factors involved.
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laws, but it would appear that this mode of attack has been precludedY
The second group is comprised of copyright holders who contend that
the number of local markets for the sale of licenses to perform their
dramatic or filmed works will be greatly reduced, because carriage
of these works by CATV systems will make licenses to perform them
less marketable to local broadcasters in areas served by such systems.
Unless CATV systems can be made to pay royalties to the copy-
right holders, they fear great economic losses.10 The litigation culminat-
ing in the instant proceeding is the first major legal effort to hold
a CATV system liable for copyright infringement and thus to assure
the future payment of royalties by CATV systems. At the trial level,
the district court" employed a rather technical electronic analysis
as a method for reaching a decision in favor of the copyright holder.
The rationale of the district court decision appears to be that when-
ever a CATV system applies energy from its own sources to reproduce
and amplify signals received from a television broadcast of copy-
righted material, then the CATV system renders a "performance"
of the work.12 If the performance is not licensed by the copyright
holder, then the CATV system is guilty of copyright infringement.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while affirming the de-
cision of the district court in favor of the copyright holder,13 found
that there was no particular legal significance to be attached to the
electronic aspects of the CATV system, 14 and chose to decide the case
9. See, e.g., Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965), rev'g 211 F. Supp. 47 (S.D. Idaho 1962); Intermountain
Broadcasting and Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.
Idaho 1961). In the Cable Vision case, the court held that broadcasters were pre-
cluded from using state unfair competition laws to attack CATV, because of the hold-
ings of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp.
v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The circuit court suggested that
the copyright laws might provide an avenue for relief.
10. It is reliably reported that "substantial" CATV penetration does indeed destroy
prospects for future licensing of copyrighted material without compensating gains in
royalties from the penetrating stations. Note, 80 HAsv. L. REv. 1514, 1524 (1967);
Hearings on H.R. 4347, Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1349-50, 1378-81 (1965).
11. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
(1966).
12. The district court found that the CATV system contained sophisticated equip-
ment to amplify, modulate, and convert to different frequencies the signals received.
These operations required the introduction of local energy into the system which was
used to produce exact replicas of the signals received. These "processed" signals were
then transmitted to petitioner's subscribers. This type of "processing" was found by
the district court to be an infringing reproduction and performance of a copyrighted
work. For a more detailed discussion of the technical aspects of this process, see note,
supra note 10, at 1519 n.33; Note, 52 VA. L. REv. 1505 (1966).
13. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1967).
14. Id. at 879. The circuit court employed a sounder reasoning here, because the
reproduction of exact replicas of the broadcaster's signal by the CATV system, a process
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on other grounds, formulating a quantitative test to determine whether
the CATV system was guilty of infringement. This test was simply:
"how much did the defendant [CATV system] do to bring about
the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?" 15 In formulating
this test, the circuit court relied primarily on the so called "multiple
performance doctrine" established in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co.16 and Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v.
New York Hotel Statler Co.'7 (SESAC), establishing the proposition
that even though an original broadcaster has performed copyrighted
material, any other person who employs mechanical means to extend
the original broadcast of that material to a larger audience than the
broadcast would otherwise command may also be considered to have
"performed" the copyrighted work.18 Armed with this doctrine, the
circuit court proceeded to compare "how much was done" by the
defendant CATV system to increase audience size by mechanical
means with "how much was done" by the hotels in Jewell-LaSalle and
SESAC to accomplish the same result, and concluded that the CATV
system "did much more," thus clearly rendering an infringing per-
formance under the multiple performance doctrine.19 In so finding,
the circuit court refused to adopt a theory of "implied license in
law" advanced by the defendant CATV system. This theory, enunci-
ated in Iewell-LaSalle2 and in an earlier broadcasting case, Buck v.
Debaum,2' holds that when a copyright holder licenses a broadcaster
crucial to the district court's finding of infringement, is not necessary to the operation
of a CATV system and by the time the appeal of the district court's decision had
reached the court of appeals, the petitioner had converted his equipment so that it
did not carry out such a reproduction. See Note, supra note 10, at 1519.
15. 377 F.2d at 877.
16. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). In this case, a hotel was held liable for copyright infringe-
ment where it maintained a master radio set wired to loudspeakers or headphones
throughout the building. The Court found that an independent performance in.
fringing upon a copyright had been rendered when the hotel received and played
through this system a song broadcast by a local radio station which had obtained no
license from the copyright holder to make such a broadcast.
17. 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). In this case, a hotel had installed loudspeakers
in its rooms, each one capable of receiving two stations. The choice as to which
one was received lay with the individual guests. The court found the hotel guilty
of infringement even though the original broadcast was licensed and the choice as to
which broadcast to receive lay with the guests. Stating that "the reception of a broad-
cast program by one who listens to it is not any part of the performance thereof," the
court went on to conclude that where a hotel "does as much as is done here to pro-
mote the reproduction ... of a broadcast program received by it, it must be considered
as giving a performance." Id. at 4.
18. See 283 U.S. at 198, 199 n.7.
19. The court cited the expense of installing antennas, cables, and connections to sub-
scriber's television sets and the fact that such activity was the primary business of
CATV, whereas it was only incidental to the hotels' business. 377 F.2d at 878.
20. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
21. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). Rejecting a claim of infringement where a cafe
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to perform a copyrighted work, he also grants an "implied license in
law" to receive and play the work to anyone who can do so, includ-
ing those who would derive some economic gain therefrom.P It has
been said that this theory of "implied license" lies "at the heart of
the question of CATV copyright liability."2 Certainly it raises clearly
the key question of "where, if anywhere, in the chain of transmissions
and public reception, the copyright owner's control should stop."
25
The circuit court, in rejecting the "implied license" theory, answered
that question in a manner giving the copyright holder practically
absolute control over his work, emphasizing that the primary pur-
pose of the Copyright Act lies in protecting the economic rights of
the copyright holder. 27
owner had played a radio for his customers over which a licensed broadcast of the
plaintiff's song was received, the district court held: "The owner of a copyrighted
musical composition can fully protect himself against any unauthorized invasion of
his property right by refusing to license the broadcasting station to perform his musical
composition; but, when he expressly licenses and consents to a radio broadcast of his
copyrighted composition, he must be held to have acquiesced in the utilization of all
forces of nature that are resultant from the licensed broadcast of his copyrighted
musical composition." Id. at 736.
22. It is worthy of note here that the defendant CATV system also advanced the
argument that even if it had rendered a performance, that performance was a private
one to which no copyright liability attached, since the broadcast transmitted through
its cables was viewed by its subscribers in the privacy of their own homes, on their
own television sets. The circuit court dismissed this argument stating, "it is settled
that a broadcast or other transmission of a work to the public ...results in a public
performance although each individual who chooses to enjoy it does so in private."
377 F.2d at 879. The circuit court cited as support Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556
(1925) and Harms, Inc. v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.
Pa. 1958) aff'd per curiam sub nom. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc.,
267 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1959).
23. See supra note 21. This theory was also advanced as a defense in SESAC, but
the court there rejected it on the ground that the actual license to broadcast gave no
implied license to any other commercial user. See supra note 17.
24. See Note, supra note 10, at 1522.
25. See B. KAPLAN, AN UrumRiaED Vmw oF Copymcrrr 104 (1967).
26. The Court of Appeals held it to be "self evident" in the age of television and
motion pictures that a copyright holder be allowed the unquestioned freedom to
limit licenses to perform works in public to defined periods, areas, and audiences.
The court reasoned that the theory of implied license was clearly inconsistent with this
"self evident" right and thus could not be applied. In support of its reasoning the
court cited dictum from an older tax case, Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944). It appears that the court may have
been influenced in its decision on this point by the fact that the CATV system was
making a sizeable profit on its operation, no part of which was shared by the copy-
right holder.
27. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of the defendant CATV system
that the primary purpose of the Copyright Act was to encourage authors and artists to
release their works to the public, and therefore rewarding the copyright holder was
only a secondary aim. Defendant cited several cases in support of its contention, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). The defendant argued that the secondary
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Rejecting the electronic analysis of the district court and the
quantitative test of the court of appeals, 28 the Supreme Court chose
instead a functional approach to the infringement issue. Reasoning
that the resolution of the issue depended upon the "function that
CATV plays in the total process of television broadcasting and recep-
tion,"29 the Court cast aside as out-dated and questionable the
precedent of Iewell-LaSalle,30 on the basis of a footnoted qualification
to the effect that if the original broadcast bad been authorized by the
copyright holder, then it might not have held the secondary broad-
caster liable for infringement.3' On the basis of this reservation, the
instant Court concluded that Jewell-LaSalle was limited to its own
facts and could not be controlling in the instant situation, because
here the- original television broadcast had been authorized by the
copyright holder. Further defining its functional approach, the Court
noted that broadcasters have always been judicially treated as per-
formers,3 while viewers have not.-3 The Court thus chose to resolve
the issue before it by discovering where CATV operations fall within
aim of reward for the copyright holder was satisfied when the copyright holder received
compensation for licensing the original broadcast. After this compensation is paid, the
CATV system should be allowed to transmit without further payment. The defendant
relied on the principle that a copyright holder may not restrict resale of a copyrighted
work after he originally sells it. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349-51
(1908). The circuit court rejected this line of argument by countering with language
from Jewell-LaSalle to the effect that control of the sale of copies is not permitted by
the Act, but that the copyright holder retains a monopoly, expressly granted to him of
all public performances for profit.
28. See supra note 4. The instant Court stated that "[M]ere quantitative contribu-
tion cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of tele-
vision broadcasting."
29. 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968).
30. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). The instant Court stated that "existing 'business relation-
ships' would hardly be preserved by extending a questionable 35-year-old decision that
in actual practice has not been applied outside its own factual context." 392 U.S. at
401 n.30.
31. 283 U.S. at 199 n.5. The instant Court ignored the holding of the district
court in SESAC, and, by its silence, impliedly disapproved the result in that case, at
least insofar as it is applicable to CATV disputes. In SESAC, the district court had
found an infringement even though the original broadcast was licensed by the
copyright holder. See supra note 17.
32. In support of this statement the Court cited Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American
Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925) (radio
broadcast; Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852
(1944) (radio broadcast of recorded program); and Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni
Macroni Co., 59 U.S.P.Q. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (radio broadcast of program received
from network). In each of these cases, broadcasting was held to be the performance
of a copyrighted work. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. In support of this contention, the Court quoted the following language from
Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (1929); "One who manually or by human agency
merely activates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are omni-
present in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not
'perform' within the meaning of the copyright law."
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the framework of this broadcaster-viewer dichotomy.1 The resulting
test is simple-if a CATV operation is found to have more in common
with broadcasting than with viewing, then such an operation amounts
to a copyright-infringing performance; however, if the CATV opera-
tion is found to have more in common with viewing than with broad-
casting, then no copyright liability can be attached to that operation.
Concluding that the instant CATV operation fell on the "viewer's side
of the line," the Court stated that a CATV system merely enhances
the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signal by providing
a well-located, efficient antenna for the viewer's television set.35 Con-
ceding that CATV systems play an "active" role in making reception
possible in a given area, the Court reasoned that the basic function
of CATV equipment is none the less little different from that served
by the equipment (receiving sets and antennas) generally furnished
by an individual viewer.36 Reasoning further that CATV systems
neither broadcast nor rebroadcast but, rather, simply "receive pro-
grams that have been released to the public [by the broadcaster] and
carry them by private channels to additional viewers," 7 the Court
found that petitioner CATV system did not render a performance
which infringed on the respondent's copyright. Dissenting, Mr. Justice
Fortas argued that the Jewell-LaSalle decision should have been dis-
positive of the instant case, and that the footnoted qualification relied
upon so heavily by the majority was too vague to serve as a basis for
distinction. He thus urged application of the multiple performance
doctrine in CATV cases.38
The instant decision will undoubtedly receive much acclaim in
the CATV camp, while being greeted with trepidation by broad-
casters and copyright holders. The effect of the instant holding is
to grant CATV systems far-reaching immunity from copyright infringe-
34. It should be noted that while the language of the opinion is stated in broad terms
apparently covering all CATV operations, the Court, by way of a footnote, has qualified
its opinion to some extent as follows: "While we speak in this opinion generally of
CATV, we necessarliy do so with reference to the facts of this case." 392 U.S. at 399
n.25.
35. 392 U.S. at 399. In support of this conclusion the Court cited language
from Lilly v. United States, 238 F.2d 584, 587 (1956): "This community antenna
service was a mere adjunct of the television receiving sets with which it was con-
nected...."
36. The instant Court stated that the "electronic operations performed by the peti-
tioner's systems are those necessary to transmit the received signal the length of the
cable efficiently and deliver a signal of adequate strength. Most of the same operations
are performed by individual television sets and antennas." 392 U.S. at 399 n.27.
37. 392 U.S. at 400.
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting, stated
that, 'fthe interpretation of the term 'perform' cannot logically turn on the question
whether the material used is licensed or not licensed." 392 U.S. at 406-07 n.5.
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ment liability. More basic is the Court's adoption of the petitioner's
view as to the primary purpose and policy of the Copyright Act-to
encourage authors and artists to release their works to the public,
while protecting the economic rights of the copyright holder in the
fruits of his creativity is only a secondary aim.39 Even though it
found that petitioner rendered no performance, an analysis of the
court's language in the light of the above policy reveals that there
is some reason to believe that even if a "performance" had been
found, the Court would have reached a result favorable to the pe-
titioner. Though the Court did not rely on the implied license theory
in reaching its decision, because it found no "performance,"40 it is
difficult to see how a Court with the same policy orientation as the
instant one could have failed to adopt the reasoning of Buck v. De-
Baum, had a "performance" been found.41 Be that as it may, it is
submitted that the entire conduct of the instant litigation, from the
district court level to the Supreme Court, has been characterized by
a kind of judicial extremism. On the one hand, the decisions of the
district and circuit courts and the dissent of Mr. Justice Fortas support
a position which would impose full copyright liability on CATV in
all situations.4 On the other hand, the majority refuses to impose
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
40. See 392 U.S. at 401.
41. The instant Court found that once a program is "released to the public" it can
then be carried to additional viewers by CATV systems for a profit. See supra note 37
and accompanying text. Compare this reasoning of the instant Court with that of the
court in Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (1929), to the effect that once a copyright
holder expressly licenses and consents to a broadcast of his material to the public,
he then acquiesces in the reception and playing of that material by anyone who can
do so, even if this subsequent operation is done for a profit. Clearly, the reasoning
of the two courts is strikingly similar. It is submitted that the reason for this
similarity is to be found in the fact that the Debaum court and the instant Court both
view the-primary purpose of the Copyright Act as being the dissemination of copy-
righted works to the public. Therefore, whether or not the "subsequent operation"
described above is classified as a "performance" or not seems to be reduced to mere
semantics. In the policy context of the instant decision, a CATV operation, whether
categorized as a performance or not can, in either case, be termed an allowable act of
dissemination. Thus, it appears likely that even if the instant Court bad found a
"performance," its policy orientation would have dictated the same result. Whether
such an allowance would have been justified in terms of the theory of implied license
or some other such reasoning is left unanswered by the instant Court.
42. Clearly, such a result would have disastrous results for CATV, and, since
there is no effective way to screen all telecasts received to determine whether or not
they are copyrighted, this would force many systems to go out of business entirely
or sell out to groups of copyright holders. It has been said that "blanket extension of
copyright liability to CATV . . . could . . . give major copyright holders not just a
means of preserving their exclusive marketing arrangements, but a powerful weapon
to gain control of the CATV industry itself." See Note, supra note 10, at 1528.
See also, NudnEs, Copmcrr § 107.41 (1967); B. Rucxrt, supra note 1, at 181;
and M. SEmr, AN ECONOMIC ANALsIs or CoMmuNITY ANTENNA TELEvIsIoN SYS-
TEMS AND THE TELEVISION BnOADCAsmNNG INDUsTRY, reprinted in Hearings an Progress
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any copyright liability on CATV, with the result that copyright hold-
ers are left with no remedy for the economic losses which they do
incur from CATV operations. It is apparent that none of the courts
dealing with the instant litigation effectively reconciled the legitimate
competing interests represented in the dispute. Indeed, given the
nature of copyright law, it is difficult to envision an adequate judicial
solution. It is submitted that the complexity of the problems pre-
sented and the unsatisfactory solutions advanced by the courts at
each level of litigation demonstrate clearly the need for action in
this area by a branch of government more flexible than the judiciary.
43
It would appear that the Federal Communications Commission,
buttressed with clear policy guidelines provided by Congress,45 would
be the logical agency of government to resolve most adequately and
amicably the competing economic, private, and public interests46 in-
volved in CATV transmission of copyrighted works.
Report From FCC-1965 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen. Comm.
on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-18 at 90-92 (1965).
43. This was the opinion of the Solicitor General who, as amicus curiae, urged the
Court to "stay its hand because, in our view, the matter is not susceptible of definitive
resolution in judicial proceedings and plenary consideration here is likely to delay and
prejudice the ultimate legislative solution." 392 U.S. at 404.
44. Action has already been begun in this area by the FCC. In March, 1966, the
Commission assumed jurisdiction over all CATV systems and promulgated certain
rules as to carriage of local television broadcasts and same-day nonduplication of
programming on local stations. The rules also required CATV systems to obtain FCC
permission before importing signals of distant stations into the primary service area of
a station in one of the top 100 markets. However, the authority of the FCC to act
in this area is unclear, and requests for clarifying guidelines from Congress have met
with no final action to date. See, B. Rucxan, supra note 1, at 178. In the absence of
Congressional action, the Supreme Court has declared that the FCC has broad powers
under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate CATV systems and prohibit their
expansion where such expansion would jeopardize broadcast service to new areas.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
45. It has proved diflcult to get Congress to act on this matter because "congressmen
have been caught in the crossfire of two vocal pressure groups-from broadcasters
demanding restraints on CATV and from the CATV industry which incites its sub-
scribers through a 'Don't Let the Government Turn Off your TV Set campaign to
flood congressmen and the FCC with mail opposing restrictions." B. Rucxmm, supra
note 1, at 178-79. Attempts at congressional action have thus far met with some de-
gree of frustration. The copyright revision bill passed by the House, 113 CONG. REc.
H. 3888 (April 11, 1967), originally contained a detailed provision covering CATV.
See H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111. This provision would have dealt flexibly
with CATV systems separately with regard to the competing interests involved in each
particular case. The provision would have made CATV fully liable for copyright
infringement in some instances, partially liable in others, and fully exempt in still
others. This provision, however, was deleted and the matter referred to the Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Committee for study. See B. KArAN supra note 25, at 127-28.,
46. See notes 5 & 7 supra and accompanying text.,
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Criminal Law-Exclusion for Cause of Prospective
Jurors With Scruples Against Death Penalty
Violates Due Process
The petitioner was found guilty of murder, the jury fixing his
penalty at death. At the trial, under authority of an Illinois statute'
the prosecution eliminated nearly half the venire of prospective jurors
by challenging for cause any veniremen who expressed qualms about
capital punishment during the voir dire.2 The Supreme Court of
Illinois denied post-conviction relief.3 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed as to penalty. Exclusion of
prospective jurors for cause because of general, conscientious, or
religious scruples against infliction of the death penalty constitutes a
denial of due process.4 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
The sixth amendment stipulates that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury .... ,5 The right of trial by an impartial jury has been
judicially construed to require more than a jury wholly composed of
unbiased individuals; it "contemplates an impartial jury drawn from
a cross-section of the community."6 The "cross-section" concept is
intended to assure that the jury be "a body truly representative of
the community,"7 in order that it will reflect contemporary community
standards.8 To satisfy the "cross-section" requirement it is not neces-
1. ILL. Rvy. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959). "In trials for murder it shall be a cause
for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious
scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same."
2. Early in the voir dire the trial judge said "let's get these conscientious objectors
out of the way," and in rapid succession 47 of the 95 veniremen were challenged for
cause. Only five said that under no circumstances would they vote to impose capital
punishment.
3. People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967).
4. The decision was given retroactive application 391 U.S. 510, 523 n.22 (1968).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968), the Court held that the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury in
criminal cases was fundamental to the American scheme of justice and obligatory on
the states under the fourteenth amendment.
6. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (emphasis added). In
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947), Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting,
said of the "cross-section" principle: "[T]here is a constitutional right to a jury
drawn from a group which represents a cross-section of the community. And a
cross-section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of training and
intelligence and with varying economic and social positions. Under our Constitution,
the jury is not to be made the representative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy
or the most successful, nor of the least intelligent, the least wealthy, or the least
successful. It is a democratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of
people."
7. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
8. For a discussion of the jury as a reflector of contemporary community standards,
see Comment, Jury Challenges, Capital Punishment, and Labat v. Bennett: A Recon-
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sary that all economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geograph-
ical groups of the community be included; but it is essential that
prospective jurors be selected without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any of these groupsY In Logan v. United States0 the
Supreme Court upheld the prosecution's challenge for cause of jurors
who had conscientious scruples against capital punishment, stating
that "[a] juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject, which
prevent him from standing indifferent between the government and
the accused, and from trying the case according to the law and the
evidence, is not an impartial juror.""- The conflict between the gov-
ernment's right to an impartial jury and the accused's "cross-section"
right has created a profound difficulty where capital punishment is at
issue.'2 The Supreme Court has said that impartiality requires not
only freedom from bias against the accused, but also from prejudice
against his prosecution.13 State courts have emphasized that the
right to be tried by an impartial jury is no more than the right to
reject those who are biased and prejudiced, not to select certain
jurors.14 If the jurors who actually try the case are impartial, it makes
no difference that other equally qualified jurors were erroneously
excluded, 5 unless the defendant can show that the exclusion actually
prejudiced him.16 The accused has no legal right to include those
on the jury whom he believes might favor his cause because of
scruples against capital punishment, for to accomplish the "balanced
jury" which the "cross-section" concept envisages would then neces-
ciliation, 1968 DuKE L.J. 283, 288-91. In Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 723 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
declared that "[tihe 'very integrity of the fact-finding process' depends on impartial
venires representative of the community as a whole."
9. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
10. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
11. Id. at 298.
12. Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
946 (1962).
13. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
14. Long v. State, 187 Tenn. 139, 144 (1947); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 242
Pa. 372, 378, 89 A. 567, 569 (1913).
15. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cr.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963
(1954): "Having no legal right to a jury which includes those who because of
scruple or bias he [the defendant] thinks might favor his cause, he suffers no
prejudice if jurors, even without sufficient cause, are excused by the judge. Only if a
judge without justification overrules a challenge for cause and thus leaves on the
panel a juror not impartial, does legal error occur."
16. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 293-94 (1947). See also Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 242 Pa. 372, 89 A. 567 (1913). But see Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942), where the Court recognized that such reasoning as this could lead
to dangerous inroads upon the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community.
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sitate the inclusion of those with bias in favor of the death penalty."
In Turberville v. United States'8 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia avoided meeting the problem head-on by reasoning that
the point at which an accused is entitled to a cross-section of the
community is when the names are put in the box from which the
panels are drawn, and that "[c]hance governs the next step."19
Using a different approach, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned in Labat v. Bennett2" that members of groups having an
individual viewpoint representative of a cognizable segment of the
community must be included as jurors, unless their absence is justified.
Historically, before a particular group's inclusion on juries under
the "cross-section" standard is required, it must (1) be one whose
exclusion was not reasonably related to the end of assembling an
impartial jury and (2) possess some degree of cohesiveness.21 The
practice of excusing on a challenge for cause prospective jurors who
are opposed to capital punishment has been followed in all but two
states,z2 as well as the federal courts.23 Originating at a time when
conviction of a capital crime brought a compulsory death sentence,
exclusion was a necessary remedy; otherwise a juror objecting to
capital punishment would never vote in favor of a defendant's guilt
because the death penalty would automatically be imposed. Today
in most states the jury is invested with a discretionary power to im-
pose death or life imprisonment upon a finding of guilty but the
general rule that the state may challenge for cause persists on the
grounds that the state is entitled to the maximum penalty if the proof
17. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963
(1954).
18. 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
19. Id.
20. 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967).
21. For a general discussion of the principles followed in regulating "group" or
"class" exclusion, so as not to damage too severely the "cross-section" concept, yet
still result in an impartial jury, see Comment, note 8 supra, at 303-09.
22. Iowa and South Dakota are the only states which do not allow capital punish-
ment objectors to be challenged for cause. State v. Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 91, 11
N.W.2d 737, 752 (1943); State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 502-03, 60 N.W. 119, 120-21
(1894); State v. Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 184, 76 N.W. 326, 327 (1898). For cases
allowing exclusion of capital punishment objectors for cause, see Gross v. State, 2
Ind. 329 (1850); Martin v. State, 16 Ohio 364 (1847); State v. Childs, 269 N.C.
307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv. 1070 (1967).
23. Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
946 (1962).
24. See Mr. Justice Douglas' separate opinion in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
523, nn.2-8 (1968). The Illinois statute permits the jury to return a verdict of death,
but when such verdict is not returned the judge can only sentence the defendant to
imprisonment. The trial judge is empowered, however, to reject a jury's recommendation
of death. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(c)(1) (Supp. 1967).
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shall justify it.25 Therefore, it is not enough that a juror be able to de-
termine guilt or innocence fairly and impartially; it is equally essential
that he be free from any preconceived opinions or convictions which
will preclude his joining in a verdict which will result in infliction of
the death penalty if the evidence so requires.2 In direct opposition to
this line of reasoning is State v. Lee2 7 in which the Iowa Supreme
Court denied the absolute right of the state to the maximum penalty.
A juror's opposition to capital punishment does not automatically dis-
qualify him if he states that he does not think his opinions will inter-
fere with the performance of his duty as a juror.2 But the positive
statement of a juror that he would not under any circumstances join
in a verdict of guilty with the death penalty, or that he could not
impose the death penalty on circumstantial evidence,29 renders him
incompetent.30 And generally, a statement evidencing a settled con-
viction that capital punishment is unjustifiable, though accompanied
by words indicating a willingness to impose the death penalty if the
facts and law so require, is sufficient to disqualify a prospective juror,
if the accompanying words create any uncertainty.'
The Court in the instant case stated that the narrow issue was
whether the prosecution could exclude all veniremen admitting
opposition to capital punishment and all who indicated that they had
conscientious scruples against inflicting it. Mr. Justice Stewart's major-
ity opinion explicitly recognized the prosecution's right to challenge
for cause those prospective jurors who say their reservations about
capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial
decision on guilt and those who say that they could never vote to
25. Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 560, 563 (1956); People v. Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 882,
423 P.2d 787, 798, 56 Cal. Rptr. 635, 646 (1967). ("[W]ere even one juror com-
mitted to a policy opposed to imposition of the death penalty in a proper case the
rendition of justice in murder cases, as presently defined in our statutes on the subject,
could be nullified").
26. Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 1960).
27. 91 Iowa 499, 502-03, 60 N.W. 119, 121 (1894). "It cannot be said that the
state is entitled to have the punishment by death inflicted in any case. The statute
authorizes the punishment, in the discretion of the jury, when a person is convicted of
murder in the first degree; but the state has no right to a trial by jurors who have
no objection against inflicting the death penalty, except as it can secure them by
challenging peremptorily those who have such objections."
28. People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal. 2d 645, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850); Williams v. Mississippi, 32 Miss.
389 (1856) (in the absence of any other evidence, juror's answer under oath that he
thinks he can do justice between the parties will be sufficient to make him competent).
29. Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340 (1946); State v. West, 69 Mo. 401
(1879).
30. Demato v. People, 49 Colo. 147, 111 P. 703 (1910); Johnson v. State, 88 Neb.
565, 130 N.W. 282 (1911).
31. Stratton v. People, 5 Colo. 276 (1880). For a complete discussion of rules on
what constitutes disqualifying scruples, see 31 Am. Jur. Jury § 187 (1958).
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impose the death penalty or that they would refuse to consider the
death penalty in the case before them. Here the jury was entrusted
with two distinct responsibilities: (1) to determine whether the
petitioner was innocent or guilty and, if guilty, (2) to determine
whether his sentence should be imprisonment or death. The Court
found no basis for petitioner's contention that the exclusion of jurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on
the issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction.32
"But," the Court stated, "it is self-evident that, in its role as arbiter
of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that
impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. "33 Since the statute gave the jury broad
discretion in deciding whether death is the proper penalty in a given
case,s the Court believed that a juror's general views about capital
punishment should play an inevitable role in any such decision.
Premising that less than half of the American public approve the
death penalty, the Court concluded that a jury composed exclusively
of such people cannot speak for the community, but "only for a
distinct and dwindling minority."m By its zeal to obtain a death-
qualified jury, the state succeeded in assembling one described by
Mr. Justice Stewart as "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die."36 Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, argued that the
constitutional right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the com-
munity forbids exclusion of even those who are so opposed to capital
punishment that they would never impose it on a defendant.31 The
three dissenting Justices emphasized that the state also had a right to
an impartial jury and criticized the majority for requiring that persons
biased against one of the critical issues (capital punishment) in a
trial be represented on the jury.38
32. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), decided the same day as
Witherspoon, the Court refused to reverse a convicted rapist's sentence of life imprison-
ment rendered by a death-qualified jury on the basis of the Witherspoon decision.
It did reverse on other grounds, however. But see Oberer, Does Disqualification of
jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue
of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 545 (1961).
33. 391 U.S. 510, 518.
34. On the jury's discretion under the Illinois statute, see note 24 supra.
35. 391 U.S. 510, 520.
36. Id.
37. Mr. Justice Douglas felt the verdict should have been reversed as to guilt as
well as penalty.
38. The dissent pointed out that when the jurors were accepted by defense counsel,
the defense still had three peremptory challenges left and that this frequently has
been taken as a convincing indication that the jury impaneled was impartial. See
cases cited in United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 963 (1954). The dissent also took note that this was the third time the
petitioner had appeared before the Illinois Supreme Court on appeal, yet the first
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Achieving an equitable balance between the prosecution's right
to an impartial jury on issues of both guilt and punishment, and
the accused's right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the com-
munity, is perhaps an overly idealistic goal. While the instant case
is to be a progressive step away from the pre-existing rules on
disqualification, some will surely reprove it for adding to the doubt
in an already nebulous area. The fine line the Court attempts to
draw between those with scruples against capital punishment who
could render a verdict according to the law and evidence, and those
with such scruples who could not, may prove to be no more than a
"semantic illusion"' 9 with scant effect on the type of jury selected.
The practical effect of the decision may be no more than to allow
some jurors to entertain a bias against capital punishment, thus
impairing the prosecutions right to an impartial jury. Where states
have abolished the mandatory death penalty, there may be no necessity
for qualifying the jury on capital punishment. May be, since life
imprisonment is already a valid legal alternative, as well as one
morally acceptable to the juror, there is no reason for the juror's
scruples against capital punishment to affect his decision on guilt.
It is submitted that jurors with scruples against capital punishment
must be allowed to serve if the jury system is to tailor effectively the
law to contemporary community standards, and thus serve one of
its most basic purposes. Persons opposed to capital punishment form
a sizable group in our society, and it is important that such repre-
sentative community viewpoints be made a part of the tailoring
process.40 Though courts have generally rejected the argument,41 a
time he had claimed denial of an impartial jury; that his trial occurred more than six
years earlier and that as a rule long delays in raising objections to trial proceedings
should not be condoned except to prevent intolerable miscarriages of justice. Mr. Justice
White, in a footnote to his separate dissenting opinion, suggested that the states might
"adjust" to the instant decision by replacing the requirement of unanimous jury
verdicts with majority verdicts on sentence. If, however, the right to trial by jury,
made obligatory on the states by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), carries
with it the requirement of jury unanimity on punishment, Andres v. United States,
333 U.S. 740 (1948), the suggestion would not be sound. It would seem-that the
jury unanimity requirement would be binding on the states since even before Duncan
the Supreme Court had said that where a state purports to accord a defendant a trial
by jury there will be a question of whether the nature of the jury trial accorded is
consistent with that which the fourteenth amendment commands. Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965).
39. 391 U.S. 510, 539.
40. A Gallup Poll released in 1965 showed 43% of the people in the United States
opposed to capital punishment; 45% in favor of it, and 12% undecided. In 1953 only
25% opposed capital punishment. Gallup Institute Press Release (Feb. 5, 1965). A
footnote in Mr. Justice Stewart's instant opinion states that in 1966 capital punishment
was opposed by 47% of the American people and favored by 42%, with 11%
undecided. 391 U.S. 520 n.16.
41. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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jury from which a large segment of society has been excluded be-
cause of scruples against capital punishment may result in prejudice
to the defendant on the question of guilt.42 Most men will feel some
opposition, however mild, to sentencing a fellow human being to
death. To select a death-qualified jury "the resort must increasingly
be to the extremists of the community-those least in touch with
modern ideas of criminal motivation, with the constant refinement of
the finest part of our cultural heritage, the dedication to human
charity and understanding."43 Still, the exclusion of capital punish-
ment opponents could be justified as being reasonably related to
assembling an impartial jury on the question of punishment. A
bifurcated trial for capital cases might serve as at least a partial
solution to this problem. The first stage would be a determination of
guilt or innocence by a jury from which no one opposed to capital
punishment was excluded, followed by a decision on punishment by
a death-qualified jury. Perhaps if a prospective juror could bring in
a death penalty in any capital case, he should not be subject to
challenge for cause, but only to a peremptory challenge. More simple,
of course, would be to limit the prosecution's challenges for death
scruples in all capital cases to the peremptory variety. Since the
defendant in fact has no effective opportunity to challenge for cause,
jurors who might be predisposed in favor of the death penalty, this
would seem to be the surest means of securing a "balanced" jury on
the question of capital punishment. Furthermore, if deemed necessary
to protect the state's statutory right to seek the death penalty, it
could be given a specified number of additional peremptory chal-
lenges. Sentiment is growing throughout society for the outright
abolition of capital punishment.44 The bases of opposition range from
religious conviction and philosophical distaste to practical considera-
tions, such as the detrimental effect capital punishment has on the
humane goal of rehabilitation and the discrimination against the poor
and minority groups which seems evident in its administration. The
Supreme Court itself has questioned the constitutionality of the
42. See Oberer, supra note 32.
43. Id. at 557.
44. President Johnson has urged Congress to approve a bill that would abolish
capital punishment as a penalty for federal crimes. Only one person has been
executed under federal law in the past 10 years, and only one prisoner is now under
penalty of death for commission of a federal crime. Thirteen states have abolished the
death penalty, as have more than 70 nations. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, testify-
ing before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee considering a bill to abolish capital
punishment for federal crimes, said that society pays a heavy price for the penalty
of death it imposes: "Our history shows the death penalty has been unjustly imposed,
innocents have been killed by the state, effective rehabilitation has been impaired,
judicial administration has suffered," although crime has not been deterred. N.Y.
Times, July 3, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
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death penalty as punishment for anything less than the actual taking
of human life.45 It is arguable that the real effect of this decision
will be to eliminate the death penalty as a possible punishment in
all save the most heinous cases. Should this prove true, one may
expect the Court to be criticized for achieving such a substantive
change by an essentially procedural device.
45. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by Douglas and Brennan,JJ.,
from the Court's denial of certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
